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NEW ENTRANT AIRLINES AND FEDERAL GRANT
ASSURANCES: THE END OF SOUTHWEST’S
DOMINANT PRESENCE AT LOVE FIELD
ALEX PAEZ*
FOR DECADES, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES enjoyed an un-precedented reign over the Dallas Love Field Airport.1 How-
ever, recent legislation opened the door to new competitors of
Southwest.2 Historically, direct air travel out of Love Field was
restricted to a small number of nearby states.3 In 2014, Congress
lifted the interstate ban on air travel to and from Love Field
through the Wright Amendment Reform Act (WARA).4 This
change brought about a renewed interest from airlines seeking
to service flights out of Love Field.5 Recently, in City of Dallas v.
Delta Air Lines, the Fifth Circuit ordered the City of Dallas to
force Southwest to continue its subleasing arrangement with
Delta Air Lines (Delta) while Delta pursues its litigation efforts
to obtain a primary lease agreement.6 The court’s analysis pri-
marily centered around competing interpretations within con-
tract law and whether Delta enjoyed rights as a third-party
beneficiary to the leasing arrangement between the City and
Southwest.7 In doing so, the court participated in an otherwise
superfluous analysis of the parties’ competing interpretations
and ignored the bigger picture by failing to fully analyze WARA
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2020; B.S., University of
Colorado, December 2012.
1 H.R. REP. NO. 109-600, at 3 (2006).
2 See Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, 120 Stat.
2011 (2006).
3 H.R. REP. NO. 109-600, at 2.
4 Id. at 9.
5 Terry Maxon, End of the Wright Amendment: Next Leg of the Journey, DALL. MORN-
ING NEWS, http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/dfw-love-field/ [https://
perma.cc/Q2MQ-L46D].
6 City of Dallas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 2017).
7 Id. at 287–88.
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and the limitations it imposes on the underlying leasing
contracts.
In 1973, the City of Dallas and the City of Fort Worth teamed
up to create one centralized airport for the two cities.8 However,
some savvy entrepreneurs, namely Southwest Airlines, saw a bus-
iness opportunity in remaining at Love Field by not signing the
letters of agreement.9 As part of the initiative, the two cities im-
plemented bond ordinances to entice airlines at their respective
city airports to sign letters of agreement stating that they would
move their operations to the newly built DFW Airport.10 The two
cities did not actually exclude commercial operations from be-
ing conducted at the existing city airports, but instead merely
asked the other airlines to relocate.11 Southwest was able to use
federal airport regulations to successfully argue that they would
be unjustly discriminated against by being forced to leave Love
Field.12 Later, Southwest successfully fought to extend its reach
beyond the Texas market with the enactment of the Airline Der-
egulation Act in 1978.13 However, this did not come without
some contingencies. Federal lawmakers recognized the monop-
olistic environment Southwest was able to create by remaining at
Love Field and enacted the Wright Amendment, which essen-
tially restricted Southwest’s interstate travel to adjacent states.14
Recently, Congress loosened the Wright Amendment’s grip
by enacting WARA in 2006, which lifted the interstate ban on
Love Field in 2014.15 Undoubtedly, this legislation created re-
newed interest from competing airlines wanting back into Love
Field. Although WARA does not directly address the process
new entrants must undertake to service gates out of Love Field,
it references the Scarce Resource provision of the underlying
gate leasing agreements as controlling the process through
which requesting airlines may receive gate access.16 Thus, the
8 H.R. REP. NO. 109-600, at 1–2.
9 The Wright Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of John D. Rocke-
feller IV, Member of Subcomm. on Aviation).
10 H.R. REP. NO. 109-600, at 1–2.
11 City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
12 Id. at 1035.
13 H.R. REP. NO. 109-600, at 2.
14 Id.
15 Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, 120 Stat. 2011
(2006).
16 City of Dallas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2017).
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courts have so far turned their attention to the underlying lease
agreements regarding new entrants such as Delta.17
In 2009 and in anticipation of WARA, Delta was able to ac-
quire a sublease for two gates out of Love Field.18 This sublease
arrangement was enough to accommodate five flights but was
due to expire in October 2014.19 In 2014, with the expiration of
their lease on the horizon, Delta sent a letter to all the signatory
airlines at Love Field requesting an accommodation of the five
flights.20 However, its accommodation was denied, and Delta
proceeded to turn to the City of Dallas for a mandatory accom-
modation.21 Dallas initially granted Delta’s request but subse-
quently rescinded the accommodation under pressure from
Southwest.22 Therein lies the problem: there was no clear policy
in place to guide the parties in the event that Dallas rescinded
its accommodation.23 Delta then filed another request for ac-
commodation through the City in October 2014.24 Dallas re-
sponded by requesting that one of the signatory airlines, either
Southwest or Virgin Atlantic, voluntarily accommodate Delta;
otherwise the City would force one of the signatory airlines to
accommodate Delta.25 When none of the airlines agreed to a
voluntarily accommodation, Dallas reached out to the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) twice for guidance.26 In concur-
rence with this note, the DOT responded both times by stating
that the City was required to accommodate Delta under federal
grant assurances.27
Instead of heeding the guidance of the DOT, the City of Dal-
las decided to file a lawsuit “seeking declaratory relief related to,
among other things, its legal obligations and rights with respect
to the Five Party Agreement, WARA, the Lease Agreements and
17 Id. at 282–83.
18 Id. at 283–84.
19 Id. at 284.
20 Id. (defining “signatory airline” as any airline with a primary gate-leasing
agreement from the city. In 2014, Southwest was a signatory for eighteen of the
twenty total gates; Atlantic was a signatory on the remaining two gates).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 288.
24 Id. at 284.
25 Id.
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federal regulations and laws affecting Love Field.”28 In response,
both Southwest and Delta filed temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions against one another over Delta’s
continued use of the gates.29
The district court initially granted Delta’s preliminary injunc-
tion, thus allowing them to continue the operation of their five
flights out of Love Field.30 Accordingly, the court denied South-
west’s motion for preliminary injunction and ruled that the City
of Dallas’s request for declaratory relief was moot because Delta
was being permitted to stay for the time being under their own
request for preliminary injunction.31 Southwest appealed the
district court’s decision, arguing that Delta had no third-party
beneficiary status to the leasing agreement and thus could not
ask the court to require mandatory accommodation by the City
pursuant to the leasing agreement.32 Although the City of Dallas
did not also appeal, it agreed with Southwest, arguing in its brief
“that although Delta should be accommodated under the Lease
Agreement, Delta is not entitled to sue as a third party creditor
beneficiary.”33
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the lower court’s order
terminating the City of Dallas’s motion for declaratory relief as
moot and instead rendered judgment declaring that Dallas was
required to allow Delta to continue its operations out of Love
Field for the time being.34 Accordingly, “[b]ecause Delta [re-
ceived] an accommodation under the City’s preliminary injunc-
tion, [the Fifth Circuit] decline[d] to address, as moot, the
district court’s grant of Delta’s motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion.”35 By doing so, the Fifth Circuit was able to set aside South-
west’s claim that Delta was not a third-party beneficiary and
center the issue on the parties’ competing interpretations of the
contract between Southwest and the City of Dallas: “Either the
Lease Agreement requires accommodation or it does not.”36
In its analysis, the court briefly turned to the underlying
WARA provisions for guidance.37 However, as mentioned above,
28 Delta Air Lines, 847 F.3d at 284.
29 Id. at 285.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 291.
32 Id. at 286.
33 Id. at 281.
34 Id. at 291.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 286.
37 Id. at 287.
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the court quickly concluded that WARA relies on the underlying
leasing agreements to establish the process through which the
City must accommodate a new entrant airline.38 Specifically, the
court examined Section 4.06F, which “provides that the Signa-
tory Airline (here Southwest) ‘agrees to accommodate such Re-
questing Airline at its Lease Premises at such times that will not
unduly interfere with its operating schedule,’” but noted that
the contract “does not define the phrase ‘unduly interfere
with.’”39 Southwest argued that the term “unduly interfere with”
means the City of Dallas was not required to accommodate a
new entrant airline because Southwest had immediate plans to
utilize all leased gates to their fullest capacity.40 However, the
court looked to statements made by the parties at the time
WARA was formed and found that the term “unduly interfere
with” means Southwest was required to accommodate a new en-
trant airline at the City’s request because it would not “unduly
interfere with” Southwest’s operations at the time the request
was made.41
In response, the dissent focused on the fact that the City of
Dallas only wanted judicial clarification of the leasing agreement
and consistently denied any legal claim against Southwest.42 In
doing so, Judge Jones argued that, because Dallas has no claim
against Southwest, the issue of whether Delta was a third-party
beneficiary is outcome determinative as to whether Delta should
have access to Love Field.43 Judge Jones then went on to explain
that the underlying leasing agreement did not provide Delta
with third-party beneficiary status and argued that Southwest’s
motion for preliminary injunction should have been granted.44
Although the court properly looked to the Scarce Resource
provision of the underlying lease agreements, the court prema-
turely looked to the parties’ intentions to resolve ambiguity
within the contract and failed to properly address other provi-
sions in WARA when interpreting the underlying leasing agree-
ments. Specifically, WARA states, “[A]ny actions taken by the
parties to such contract that are reasonably necessary to imple-
ment its provisions, shall be deemed to comply in all respects
38 Id. at 288.
39 Id. at 287.
40 Id. at 290.
41 Id. at 289–90.
42 See generally id. at 292 (Jones, J., dissenting).
43 Id.
44 Id.
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with the parties’ obligations under title 49.”45 Additionally,
WARA provides, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed . . . to
limit the authority of the Federal Aviation Administration or any
other Federal agency to enforce requirements of law and grant
assurances . . . .”46 Thus, through Title 49 of the U.S. Code and
the corresponding grant assurances, WARA necessarily dictates
that the underlying lease agreements must accommodate new
entrants. Furthermore, even if, as the dissent argues, the case
must ultimately come down to whether Delta enjoys rights as a
third-party beneficiary, Title 49 and the corresponding grant as-
surances require that the underlying lease agreements grant
third-party beneficiary status to airlines seeking accommodation
as a new entrant.
By participating in the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) pro-
gram, airport sponsors (here, the City of Dallas) are able to re-
ceive federal funding.47 In turn, airport sponsors are required to
make certain operational assurances to the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) stating that they will function in a nondis-
criminatory manner.48 Although the power to enforce these
grant assurances remains with the FAA, 49 U.S.C. § 47107 backs
up these grant assurances through the enactment of the Airport
and Airway Improvement Act (AAIA).49 Specifically, Federal
Grant Assurance 22, the Economic Nondiscrimination grant,
which implements the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(1)
through (6), requires that an airport operator “make the airport
available as an airport for public use on reasonable terms and
without unjust discrimination to all types, kinds, and classes of
aeronautical activities, including commercial aeronautical activi-
ties offering services to the public at the airport.”50 The FAA has
interpreted this assurance to require airport sponsors to make
space available for new entrants so long as it is reasonably possi-
ble.51 Thus, the fact that Southwest was able to accommodate
Delta’s request at the time the request was made mandated that
45 Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, 120 Stat. 2011
(2006).
46 Id.
47 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) (2018).
48 Id. § 47107(a)(1).
49 See id. § 47107(a).
50 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ASSURANCES: AIRPORT SPONSORS (2014).
51 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 5190.6B, FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL,
at 8-6 (2009).
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the City of Dallas negotiate the terms of its lease with Southwest
to accommodate Delta.
Ironically, the FAA’s use of the words “if reasonably possible”
are eerily similar to the “unduly interfere with” language that
the court focused on in its interpretation of the leasing agree-
ment. There, Southwest argued that the court should have
taken into consideration the fact that it had plans to scale up
towards full utilization of its leased premises when Delta re-
quested accommodation, so Delta’s request would “unduly in-
terfere with” Southwest’s operations.52 In this regard, the court
noted that the language of the leasing agreements and state-
ments concerning the parties’ intentions at the time WARA was
constructed indicate that Southwest was required to accommo-
date Delta if it could do so at the time of their request. Addition-
ally, the court found that the terms of WARA may even provide
for accommodation under an exclusive lease agreement where
Southwest was fully utilizing its leased gates.53
However, the court did not need to look to the intentions of
the parties to resolve the ambiguity in the leasing agreements.
Federal Grant Assurance 23, Exclusive Rights, prohibits a spon-
sor from directly or indirectly granting an air carrier the exclu-
sive right to use a gate.54 Moreover, Section 47107(a)(3) of Title
49 of the U.S. Code states that “the airport operator will not
withhold unreasonably the classification or status of tenant or
signatory from an air carrier that assumes obligations substan-
tially similar to those already imposed on air carriers of that clas-
sification or status.”55 In fact, some courts have interpreted this
language to require accommodation by the City of Dallas in situ-
ations very similar to the case at hand.56 Admittedly, Love Field
is unique from other airports in that WARA limits its number of
gates to twenty.57 Accordingly, some may argue that the City
would not be unreasonably withholding signatory status from a
new airline if all gates were currently being occupied to full ca-
pacity because the City is unable to construct new gates. To this
52 City of Dallas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.3d 279, 288 (5th Cir. 2017).
53 Id. at 288–89.
54 FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 51, at 6-7.
55 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(3) (2018).
56 See Midway Airlines, Inc. v. Westchester City, 584 F. Supp. 436, 440–41
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Arapahoe Cty. Pub. Airport Auth. v. Centennial Exp. Air-
lines, Inc., 956 P.2d 587, 596–97 (Colo. 1998).
57 Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, 120 Stat. 2011
(2006).
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end, the FAA Office of Chief Counsel has previously “deter-
mined that a sponsor may not deny an air carrier access solely
based on the nonavailability of existing facilities.”58 Therefore, it
is reasonable to conclude that Dallas must allow Delta access to
gates at Love Field for the underlying lease agreements to be
compatible with WARA and Title 49.
Lastly, assuming the court correctly looked to Title 49 of the
United States Code and the corresponding grant assurances to
resolve ambiguity in the underlying lease agreements, the dis-
sent may still be correct in concluding that Delta must have
rights as a third-party beneficiary to remain at Love Field.59
However, Federal Grant Assurance 23, the Exclusive Rights
grant, mandates that Delta be given rights as a third-party bene-
ficiary.60 As discussed above, Federal Grant Assurance 23 prohib-
its a sponsor from directly or indirectly granting an air carrier
the exclusive right to use a gate.61 Thus, if a new entrant airline
seeks accommodation to service gates out of Love Field but is
denied access simply because they do not have rights as a third-
party beneficiary, the City of Dallas has indirectly created a pro-
hibited exclusive right in Southwest to use the gates.
With the parties due back in court in February 2019, they
have recently come to a short-term agreement, allowing a re-
questing airline gate access for a minimum of three years pro-
vided the gate space is not currently in use.62 While this is surely
a temporary fix, Delta and other airlines have expressed con-
cerns about the agreement and what it could mean for their
future operations out of Love Field.63 More importantly, the
short-term agreement does not provide a requesting airline with
the option of signatory status as a primary leaseholder, bringing
into question the validity of the agreement under Section
47107(a)(3).64 Additionally, under these new terms, if another
airline currently requested accommodation into Love Field and
was denied tenant status because the gates are at full capacity,
58 FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 51, at 9-10.
59 See City of Dallas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.3d 279, 291–92 (5th Cir.
2017) (Jones, J., dissenting).
60 See generally FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 51, at 8-1.
61 Id. at 6-7.
62 Conor Shine, Southwest, Delta, American and More Object to Dallas’ Love Field




64 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(3) (2018).
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then the City of Dallas would likewise be in violation of Section
47107(a)(3).
Love Field is distinguishable from almost every other airport
in the nation due to the federal constraints WARA has placed
on its operations. WARA’s cap on the number of gates at Love
Field has resulted in a relatively high barrier to entry. So far,
other airports have been able to comply with grant assurances
and Title 49 by using PFC funding to construct new gates when
a new entrant requests access to the airport. Some critics of
WARA have admonished the statute for artificially creating mar-
ket constraints and claim that it should be repealed in its en-
tirety. Unfortunately, practical limitations and local restraints
will eventually cause other airports to reach their maximum
growth capacity, like the situation artificially created at Love
Field. As they do, airports will increasingly become unable to
accommodate requesting airlines seeking access to their gates.
The ultimate outcome in Delta’s access to Love Field may serve
as a precursor for other airlines at Love Field and also airlines
seeking entrance into congested airports across the country.
